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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
How do prosecutors understand their own professional self-identities?  Do 
they change their images of the prosecutor’s ideal role over the course of their 
careers?  If so, is there a correlation between the place in which the prosecutor 
works and changes in that professional self-image? 
We think these questions are important for two reasons, separate and apart 
from the prosecutor’s impact on the outcomes in individual criminal cases.  First, 
while defendants, victims, and advocates care intensely, maybe even exclusively, 
about their own case outcomes, the goals of scholars ought to be more complex: 
our task is to explain the nuances of the living criminal justice organism, not just 
its end products.
1
  For that reason, we should examine various aspects of the 
system—including the prosecutor’s role—from different angles, using different 
methodologies, to answer more layered inquiries.  Second, although prosecutors 
hold unmatched power in criminal justice, they do not unilaterally determine 
outcomes in a straightforward sense.  Many factors outside of the prosecutor’s 
control have a bearing on criminal case outcomes: the triadic relationship between 
the prosecutors’ office, the bench, and the bar; the political conservatism of the 
underlying jurisdiction; and the rate of serious crime in the jurisdiction, to name 
just a few.
2
  These exogenous features shape the space in which prosecutors work; 
they influence what prosecutors value, and what they are willing to sacrifice or 
                                                                                                                                      
*   Needham Y. Gulley Professor of Criminal Law, Wake Forest University; Professor of Law, 
Emory University.  We appreciate the insightful comments we received on earlier drafts from Carissa 
Hessick, David Johnson, Jennifer Laurin, Jenia Turner, Loic Wacquant, and Ellen Yaroshefsky.  The 
empirical data collection inspiring this article received funding from Wake Forest University and a 
University Research Grant from Emory University. 
1   In emphasizing the importance of institutional fabric as a subject of study, we build on the 
insights of Peter Nardulli and his co-authors, who proclaimed nearly three decades ago, that limiting 
research on criminal justice institutions to case outcomes “would be like limiting research on 
Congress to votes.”  PETER F. NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF 
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 368 (1988).  
2   See JAMES EISENSTEIN, ROY B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF 
JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1999); ROY B. FLEMMING, PETER F. NARDULLI & JAMES 
EISENSTEIN, THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992); 
PAMELA UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT (1978); 
Leonard R. Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by His 
Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 52 (1981). 
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argue for.  Scholarship that explores the professional self-image and working 
environment of prosecutors can reveal how prosecutors use the space available to 
them, how they respond to or push against local constraints.  In short, the 
prosecutor’s philosophy of the job, beyond just case outcomes achieved, merits 
sustained scholarly attention in the form of rigorous empirical study. 
Toward that end, in our recent article, The Cure for Young Prosecutor’s 
Syndrome,
3
 we suggested that a common path of professional development seems 
to exist for many prosecutors working in state courts in the United States.  We 
interviewed hundreds of state prosecutors in the Southeastern and Southwestern 
United States, asking about their professional selves, their colleagues, their bosses, 
their adversaries, and their future plans.  Based on what we heard, we posited that 
most state prosecutors appear to become more balanced, rather than more 
zealously adversarial, over the course of their careers.  They start off their careers 
as gung-ho, hot-headed warriors but over time learn to embrace pragmatism and 
proportionality.  While we heard stories about seasoned prosecutors who were 
unbalanced zealots and learned about offices that fanned the flames, our 
contention—that balance appears to be the ordinary career development path of 
most prosecutors—was based on the dominant narrative in our interviews.  
Professor Laurie Levenson disagrees with us about the natural career arc of 
prosecutors.  In The Problem with Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome,4 she describes 
experienced prosecutors who are highly cynical and callous about defendants.  A 
sense of balance—as we describe it—is nowhere in sight.  The prosecutors in Los 
Angeles she met in an adversarial post-conviction setting were uninterested in 
distinguishing between defendants or in considering the substantive justice 
concerns that emanated from certain case files.  For these prosecutors, 
unquestioned loyalty to comrades, certainty of guilt, and finality of prosecution 
were the ruling values.  
Certainly it is possible that our interviews produced unreliable information,
5
 
or that the post-conviction setting of Professor Levenson’s work influenced the 
prosecutors there in ways that do not reflect the general prosecutor population.
6
  
                                                                                                                                      
3   Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1065 (2014); see also Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Risk, Maturation, and 
Wrongful Conviction Practice, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705553.  
4   Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem with Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a 
Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335 (2015).  
5   See Levine & Wright, supra note 3 (describing the limitations of our research design and 
defending our data on reliability grounds).  
6   The post-conviction setting could explain much of what Levenson reports about 
prosecutorial cynicism, for a number of reasons.  For example, post-conviction claims are not 
regularly reviewed by a judge who might influence the expression of excessive zeal by the 
prosecutor’s office.  Moreover, the claims are not subject to procedural mechanisms that force 
cooperation—such as reciprocal discovery rules—and are handled in a practice setting that is based 
on the presumption of guilt, rather than the presumption of innocence. 
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But is there any way for both of these portraits of prosecution to reveal some truth, 
each manifesting an important but different slice of reality?  We think there is, but 
only if one considers the importance of place in each study. 
In this essay, we explore the reasons why studies of offices of different sizes, 
located in demographically and culturally different regions, might reveal different 
truths about how prosecutors behave.  No doubt there is some degree of 
isomorphism among prosecutors’ offices, so it makes sense at times to draw 
general lessons about the work of prosecutors.  But state prosecution offices in the 
United States are insular, sometimes idiosyncratic entities.  We believe that large 
urban offices in particular are not typical of the working environment for most 
state prosecutors.  In other words, because “American prosecution is highly 
localized,”7 practices in one office (particularly a large urban office) may not be 
the norm in other places, such as mid-sized or smaller offices in suburban and rural 
settings.  In light of this insularity, researchers and readers should tread cautiously 
before they generalize about American prosecutor behavior based on studies of 
single offices, particularly when those offices are large and operate in big cities.  
While we believe it is possible to apply findings or recommendations from one 
prosecutor research context to another, such applications should demonstrate 
awareness of the differences between places.  To put it simply, place matters in 
prosecution research. 
The observation that place matters has been a mainstay of sociological and 
political science research for decades.
8
  More particularly, scholars have 
recognized the link between organizational size and organizational culture in 
related criminal justice contexts, such as policing
9
 and courts.
10
  In this respect, as 
in many others, the scholarly treatment of prosecutors lags behind that of other 
                                                                                                                                      
7   Marc L. Miller & Samantha Caplinger, Prosecution in Arizona: Practical Problems, 
Prosecutorial Accountability, and Local Solutions, in PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 265, 267 (Michael Tonry ed., 2012).  Loïc Wacquant has argued that American 
government as a “bureaucratic field” is highly decentralized, fragmented and therefore localized; we 
should expect nothing different in the sub-specialty of prosecution.  See LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING 
THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009).  
8   See PETER DREIER, JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF & TODD SWANSTROM, PLACE MATTERS: 
METROPOLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014); JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, 
URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987); ROBERT E. PARK, ERNEST W. BURGESS 
& RODERICK D. MCKENZIE, THE CITY: SUGGESTIONS FOR INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE 
URBAN ENVIRONMENT (1925); ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE 
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012); Thomas F. Gieryn, A Space for Place in Sociology, 26 
ANN. REV. SOC. 463 (2000).  
9   See David Eitle, Stewart J. D’Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, The Effect of Organizational and 
Environmental Factors on Police Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q. 103 (2014); but see David A. Klinger, 
Environment and Organization: Reviving a Perspective on the Police, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 126 (2004) (explaining why more research should be done on police culture).  
10   See EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2 (explaining importance of correlations between the size 
of courts and the communities they govern for how well the courts function).  
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criminal justice organizations.
11
  In this essay, we try to fill one small part of this 
remarkable gap by suggesting some reasons why the combination of office size 
and organizational culture—the place where the prosecutor works—might matter 
to the prosecution function.  In so doing, we aim to accomplish more than simply 
observing that data from large and small offices might be irreconcilable; we hope 
to advance a conversation about the feedback loop between institutional design and 
prosecutorial culture. 
 
II. THE ACADEMIC PREFERENCE FOR LARGE URBAN OFFICES 
 
Legal scholars have published a torrent of books and articles in the past fifty 
years on the subject of prosecutorial behavior, many of them based on field studies 
of large urban offices.  Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, Philadelphia, and the 
various boroughs of New York are all favorite spots for academics to research, 
observe, and critique.  It is no wonder these locations are popular choices: they are 
the home of many prominent universities, and many criminal law and procedure 
scholars began their legal careers practicing in these cities.  For those wanting to 
add a quantitative component to their study, these jurisdictions offer large numbers 
of cases to review.  Given the scholarly emphasis on criminal justice outcomes, 
these offices are likewise appealing because they account for a significant 
percentage of the felony convictions each year in the United States.
12
  Familiarity, 
personal networks, proximity, and the opportunity for large-scale data collection 
make these cities natural sites for research. 
But has this emphasis on outcome-based research led legal scholars to focus 
disproportionately on large city prosecutor offices in their published research?  To 
find a tentative answer to this question, we conducted an informal review of the 
academic literature published in the United States since 1966 to see if we could 
detect a bias in favor of large urban research locales in works that rely on empirical 
data about state prosecutors.
13
 
                                                                                                                                      
11  See supra note 2.  The works previously cited, produced by prominent sociologists several 
decades ago, stand out as a counter-trend.  
12  We generated a rough estimate of office output based on data from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS).  Although the BJS does not report the percentage of felony convictions obtained by 
the twenty largest prosecutor offices, it did estimate that state court prosecutors obtained 1,078,920 
felony convictions in 2004; the same researchers also estimated that the seventy-five largest counties 
generated 29,727 felony convictions in May 2004.  See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS tbl.5.44.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5442004.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z
YJ-HZEQ] & tbl.5.58.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5582004.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8P9D-F7EN] (2016).  By multiplying the May figure by twelve, we estimate that 356,724 felony 
convictions derived from the seventy-five largest offices, about 33% of the national total.  The twenty 
largest offices generated some fraction of that total; for our rough purposes in this article, we estimate 
the proportion to be something less than 25%.  
13  By empirical data about prosecutors, we mean works that use survey data, interviews, 
systematic observation, or analysis of case file data to report on patterns of prosecutor behavior.  
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Our definition of large urban offices derives from a national survey, 
conducted by the Department of Justice and published in 2005.
14
  The twenty 
largest offices employed as few as 163 and as many as 886 full-time attorneys; 
they handled felony prosecutions for districts with populations ranging from 
600,000 to 10,400,000 people.
15
 
Having identified the twenty largest state prosecution offices, we searched 
various databases of legal and social science scholarship, using different 
combinations of search terms along the lines of “empirical,” “prosecutor,” and 
“office.”16  The searches turned up works published in student-edited law reviews 
and peer-reviewed academic journals, as well as books and book chapters.  
Overall, we found 123 works that included empirical analysis of state prosecutor’s 
offices.
17
 
It does appear that large urban offices get disproportionate attention in 
prosecutor research.  As Table 1 indicates, 75 of the 123 articles we found included 
some empirical analysis of prosecutor behavior in the twenty largest urban offices.  
These large offices represent less than one percent of the total number of state 
prosecutors’ offices handling felonies; they employ less than one-quarter of the 
felony prosecutors in the country and file less than one-quarter of the felony 
matters in state court each year.
18
  Yet, as Table 1 shows, they form the basis of 
over 61% of the empirical studies of prosecutors in the United States.  
                                                                                                                                      
14  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PROSECUTORS 
SURVEY 2005 (2007), http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04600.v1. 
15  The locations on the list, in descending order of number of prosecuting and supervising 
attorneys employed as of 2005, are: Los Angeles County, California (886); Cook County, Illinois 
(830); New York County, New York (441); Kings County, New York (375); Maricopa County, 
Arizona (324); Bronx County, New York (306); Miami-Dade County, Florida (288); Queens County, 
New York (283); Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania (278); District of Columbia (250); Orange 
County, California (227); Harris County, Texas (226); Riverside County, California (223); Broward 
County, Florida (213); Baltimore, Maryland (213); San Bernardino County, California (206); King 
County, Washington (193); Wayne County, Michigan (180); Suffolk County, New York (166); and 
Sacramento County, California (163).  Id. 
16  We conducted eleven distinct searches in five electronic databases of scholarship (Westlaw, 
Lexis, HeinOnline, Google Scholar, and Web of Science), supplementing those searches with works 
already familiar to us from our routine reading files.  Details of the searches are available from the 
authors upon request. 
17  Our searches also turned up ten works that focused exclusively on federal prosecution 
offices.  Because the federal prosecution bureaucracy is an entirely different animal than the localized 
state prosecutor’s office—both in terms of laws applied and norms of adherence to rules promulgated 
by a centralized national authority—we excluded federal prosecution research from our analysis here.  
We made an exception for the prosecutor’s office in Washington, D.C., which prosecutes 
misdemeanors and lesser felonies, much the same as any other urban office in a state system. 
18  See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7QA6-N6NT].  Table 1 shows total employment of approximately 26,520 assistant 
prosecutors and chief prosecutors; total 2005 employment of twenty largest offices was 6,410 
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A number of the studies we identified were based on statewide or nationwide 
data regarding the processing of cases.  Perhaps these studies artificially inflated 
the presence of large offices: these studies necessarily included the largest offices, 
not because the researcher chose the office over other possible research locations, 
but because the large city simply counted as one member of a broader group of 
offices.
19
  If we exclude these statewide or nationwide studies to focus only on the 
analyses that reflected the researcher’s selection of particular offices to study, the 
percentage of studies that address the largest urban offices remains oversized, at 
57%.  
 
Table 1. Proportion of Empirical Prosecutor Studies Devoted to the 
Twenty Largest Urban Offices 
 
Type of Jurisdiction Studied 
Number of 
Studies 
Percent 
Large Urban Offices, among all studies 75 61% of total 
Large Urban Offices, among selective studies 56 57% of subgroup 
 
We also wondered whether data about large offices holds outsized influence 
in ongoing scholarly conversations about prosecutorial behavior.  To explore this 
question, we performed a citation study to gauge how often scholars and judges 
cited each of these 123 empirical works.  Our measure of citation power for each 
empirical study started with the number of citations to the work in Westlaw’s law 
review database, the Lexis law review database, and Google Scholar.
20
  After 
normalizing and averaging the scores from these three sources, we ranked the 123 
published studies. 
Among studies in the top half of the citation rankings, 65% included analyses 
of the largest urban offices.
21
  The twenty articles that are cited most frequently 
                                                                                                                                                   
attorneys, which amounts to roughly 22% of total employment.  Id.  For details about our estimate of 
the proportion of felony filings generated in these twenty offices, see supra note 12. 
19  See, e.g., David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial 
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J. L. & ECON. 591 (2005) (nationwide study 
processing statistics from 75 large urban counties); Jo Dixon, The Organizational Context of 
Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157 (1995) (statewide study of Minnesota prosecution).  
20  For the precise search terms we employed to generate the citations, contact the authors.  We 
also calculated the number of citations in the HeinOnline, HeinOnline Scholar Check, and Web of 
Science (formerly known as the Institute for Scientific Information Citation Index).  Because none of 
these latter sources provided coverage for all publication types that we included in our study, we did 
not include these citation totals in our final index.  Those results, however, were broadly consistent 
with the results from other databases in those instances where citations were available. 
21  Full results of the citation study are available upon request from the authors. 
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include analyses of Chicago,
22
 Philadelphia,
23
 Baltimore,
24
 Seattle,
25
 Manhattan,
26
 
and Los Angeles.
27
  An appendix to this essay lists the 123 empirical works and 
their citation rankings.  
Putting the publication and citation indices together, it appears that the largest 
prosecutor offices garner the most attention in academic circles.  Based on the 
overall number of offices, the number of attorneys employed, and the number of 
felony cases filed in those offices, it appears to us that prosecutor offices outside 
the top twenty deserve more study and discussion than they have received from 
scholars looking to understand prosecutorial behavior and decision-making on a 
broad scale. 
  
III. OUTCOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LARGER AND SMALLER  
PROSECUTOR OFFICES 
 
The scholarly works based on large urban prosecutor offices have been 
invaluable; they have given us reams of information about case outcomes and 
vividly portray the impact of volume on a justice system.
28
  But as researchers 
interested in how prosecutors think about themselves and their careers, our work 
often takes us into mid-sized and smaller prosecutor offices.  Based on our 
research experiences in these locations, we fear that the publication emphasis on 
large urban centers may have skewed the published portrait of the profession as a 
whole. 
The issue is typicality.  If the patterns that scholars have observed in Chicago, 
Los Angeles, and New York are likely to be found elsewhere, then the concerns 
they raise and the reforms they suggest are likely to make sense elsewhere, too.  
However, there are more than 2,300 state prosecution offices in the United States 
that handle felony cases, and most of them serve populations of fewer than 
                                                                                                                                      
22  See Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 
(1968).  
23  See Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargain Process, 119 U. PA. L. 
REV. 439 (1971).  
24  See JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977).  
25  See Wallace D. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on 
Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REV. 543 (1980).  
26  See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical 
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002).  
27  See Cassia Spohn, John Gruhl & Susan Welch, The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of 
Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1987).  
28  See supra note 12.  
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100,000 people.
29
  Offices serving these smaller communities employ an average 
of 10 prosecutors.
30
  Crime rates, criminal justice funding, and levels of hostility or 
cooperation between the prosecutor’s office, the defense bar, and the judiciary all 
vary significantly from place to place.
31
  In light of the differences among locales 
and the centrifugal forces that encourage chief prosecutors to focus on community 
priorities, scholars should rein in their instinct to generalize. 
There could be systematic differences between urban, suburban and rural 
lawyers and their practice environments.
32
  To begin with, small and large offices 
can produce persistently different outcomes, even when applying the same state 
law.  Defendants prosecuted in large urban jurisdictions sometimes receive more 
lenient outcomes than people prosecuted in smaller regions for the same violation 
(we therefore should not assume that small necessarily means beautiful).
33
  The 
District Attorney in King County, Washington (Seattle), for example, treats low-
level drug and property crimes more leniently than smaller offices in the state.
34
  In 
North Carolina, large offices are more likely than small offices to dismiss felony 
assault cases outright in order to focus on more violent crimes.
35
 
These differences in outcomes, however, do not indicate whether prosecutors 
in urban offices embrace a more or less adversarial concept of the prosecutor’s role 
than their counterparts in smaller offices.  The pattern of outcomes might reflect 
prosecutor office policy or the attitude of individual prosecutors, but the outcome 
differences could just as easily occur despite the prosecutors’ preferences, rather 
than because of them.  For example, prosecutors in urban offices might see their 
proper role as trying to resist downward pressures on criminal charges or calls for 
lenient punishments sought by an active defense bar and liberal judiciary.  Judicial 
tendencies might in turn be related to jurisdictional features, like low levels of 
                                                                                                                                      
29  See STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURT, 2007 – Statistical Tables 1 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ25-46DV]. 
30  See id., at 4 tbl.2. 
31  See UTZ, supra note 2; Mellon et al., supra note 2. 
32  See Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Rural Hospital Ownership: Medical Service 
Provision, Market Mix, and Spillover Effects, 46 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1452 (2011) (arguing that the 
marked divergence between rural and urban health care cautions against applying findings from one 
research context across-the-board). 
33  We thank Loïc Wacquant for pointing this out and for suggesting that scholars guard 
against this sort of bias. 
34  See David Boerner, Prosecution in Washington State, in PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 167, 201–03 (Michael Tonry ed., 2012). 
35  See Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North Carolina, in 
PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 211, 221 (Michael Tonry ed., 2012).  
Large North Carolina offices also tend to be more selective in their use of the habitual felon law, 
whereas small offices tend to file the charge whenever the defendant’s prior record meets the 
statutory criteria.  Id. at 222. 
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political conservatism or high rates of serious crimes in cities.  In such an 
environment, high levels of adversariness in prosecutor attitudes would produce 
only muted effects on case outcomes.  Likewise, if smaller jurisdictions with lower 
rates of serious crime and more political conservatism elect judges who are 
inclined to sentence harshly, prosecutors may be more open to behaving 
proportionately and pragmatically when filing charges and making plea offers 
because they regard the judiciary as a supportive backstop, rather than as a hazard 
to avoid.  If case outcomes in these smaller jurisdictions are more severe than in 
large urban jurisdictions, judicial attitudes, rather than the prosecutors’ embrace of 
adversariness, might be responsible. 
In sum, jurisdictions can differ along both outcome and prosecutorial self-
image dimensions, and both of these features might have something to do with the 
size of the office, its geographic location, its location in the local political sphere, 
and features of the community.  An infatuation with outcomes could lead scholars 
to miss some important truths about the profession of prosecution itself.  For that 
reason, we ought not to assume that large offices—just because they contribute the 
most data to nationwide outcome trends—have cornered the market on how 
prosecutors think and behave in the professional sphere. 
We discuss below two features of prosecutor offices in the largest urban 
settings that might shape adversarial culture in fairly predictable ways: the 
relatively weak influence of courtroom workgroups, and the relatively high 
turnover rates among prosecutors.  Without the incentives for cooperation provided 
by working groups and with the lure of a lucrative defense career on the horizon, 
attorneys in these offices seem less inclined to collaborate with judges and defense 
attorneys as they set normal expectations for resolving criminal cases.  In short, 
these features of an office are likely to make the prosecutors there more 
adversarial.  These two characteristics offer theoretical reasons to treat large 
offices as a separate “place” category from medium and smaller offices for 
scholarly analysis. 
 
IV. EXTERNAL PRESSURE FROM COURTROOM WORKGROUPS 
 
There are some places that push prosecutors to look inward for their signals 
about how to approach the job; other places encourage prosecutors to look outside 
their own offices for clues about what works.  The literature is replete with 
evidence that courthouse personnel who know each other and work together on a 
regular basis will form stable relationships with one another and define their 
professional success according to how well they keep the courtroom’s caseload 
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moving.  For the working group, a case is not simply a case; it is instead part of a 
workflow that the same judge and attorneys resolve in tandem.
36
 
In an environment built around courtroom workgroups, excessive 
adversariness does not amount to good lawyering.  Instead, it signals the 
breakdown of valuable courtroom relationships.  For that reason, prosecutors in 
stable working groups tend to moderate their adversarial stance to accommodate 
relationship concerns.  They share with the defense attorney and the judge a 
history, ethos and collective expectation of collegial relations and respect for one 
another’s place in the system.  In courtrooms that lack stable workgroups, where 
strangers rather than colleagues handle the cases, there is no need for such 
moderation.  There is no past or future relationship to preserve and no set of 
expectations to guide behavior or to nourish an environment of respect. 
In offices where productive, stable workgroups are the norm, the leadership of 
the prosecutor’s office can signal behavioral expectations to line attorneys.  When 
the chief prosecutor gets word from the judge or the local public defender that a 
prosecutor assigned to one courtroom makes unreasonable plea offers or acts in a 
disrespectful way, she is likely to call the errant prosecutor into her office and tell 
him to tone it down.  She might also ask more seasoned prosecutors to pre-clear or 
audit this prosecutor’s plea offers.  She could also move the prosecutor into a 
different courtroom.  We even heard some stories about prosecutors losing their 
jobs for refusing to get along with the other courtroom actors.  In this sort of office, 
prosecutors get the message that balance, rather than adversariness, is the path to 
success. 
Certainly cooperation can become pathological when taken to excess.  
Journalist Amy Bach unearthed appalling practices in a few jurisdictions in the 
United States, such as a city in upstate New York where no lawyer was willing to 
complain about a city judge who accepted guilty pleas from defendants who were 
not even present in the courtroom.
37
  In some locations in Georgia, prosecutors and 
judges turned a blind eye to troubling public defender practices, such as allowing 
defendants to take plea deals after brief conversations and no investigation, or 
failing to appear in the courtroom when pleas were taken.
38
  Practices such as these 
remind us that too much cooperation among working group members can lead to 
injustice in the name of efficiency. 
Is there a correlation between prosecutor office size and the stability of 
courtroom working groups?  We think there is.  Large urban offices tend not to 
                                                                                                                                      
36  See EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 24; MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE 
EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); FLEMMING, NARDULLI & 
EISENSTEIN, supra note 2. 
37  AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT (2009). 
38   Id. at ch. 1. 
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staff courtrooms with a stable slate of prosecutors.
39
  The line prosecutors rotate 
through dozens of courtrooms without learning the local rules of the road.  
Moreover, the size of the defense bar in large urban jurisdictions is enormous.  
Prosecutors may see a particular defense attorney only sporadically—perhaps only 
once every few years—if she is not a public defender.  The attorneys thus have less 
incentive to bargain civilly with each other, because they neither draw on past 
goodwill nor care about building future trust. 
Furthermore, in places that value cooperation between prosecutors and other 
courtroom actors, innovative methods of case resolution can spring up.  For 
instance, while the two largest Arizona offices resemble the urban prosecutors’ 
offices commonly described in the scholarly literature, the smaller counties rely on 
an interesting variety of methods to resolve cases.
40
  In one small county, all plea 
bargaining conferences happen at a designated time in one small room (known as 
the “Sharkfest”), so that parties to other cases can observe, hear, and even chime in 
on suggested case resolutions.
41
 
The following commentary from one of our interviewees explicitly links the 
size of the legal community to the presence of stable working groups, and to the 
concomitant effects on working relationships.  When the community was small, 
she reminisced, there was a sense of closeness among colleagues in the 
prosecutor’s office but also among criminal justice actors more generally, and 
those interactions created an informal means of social control.  But with significant 
growth in the jurisdiction that sense of closeness and control became impossible to 
maintain, because prosecutors and defense attorneys no longer knew each other.  
Adversariness increased as a result.  
 
Interviewee: I think that back then we had a much closer relationship 
with the defense bar and the court.  And the court was much more likely 
to just say, “Don’t do that,” whereas now, they might report you to the 
state bar.  And defense attorneys, we had a much closer relationship with 
the defense bar and everybody knew that your reputation was everything 
and you better not screw up because then you would’ve burnt a bridge 
with the public defender’s office or the private defense bar or the court.  
And everybody just kind of kept each other in check.  But it’s now such a 
                                                                                                                                      
39  There are surely exceptions to this trend; the District Attorney of Alameda County, an 
office of about 120 attorneys, is one that has already been documented.  See UTZ, supra note 2; David 
Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247 
(1998).  
40  See Miller & Caplinger, supra note 7, at 272.  
41  Id. at 280; see also Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea 
Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325 
(2016) (describing multi-attorney conferences in small or mid-sized jurisdictions in Michigan, 
California, and Florida).  
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big system that it seems like people don’t just—well, we didn’t have 
email.  People don’t just pick up the phone any more and call each other. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think the size is the primary factor that’s 
influenced the change from how it was? . . .  
 
Interviewee:  I think that’s a large part of it because when I visit smaller 
counties, they still have that open communication.  They are all in the 
same building.  They go out to lunch together.  They do things that are 
much more difficult to do in a larger environment.  
 
Interviewer: Do you think that there were benefits to that environment 
versus the current— 
 
Interviewee:  I think there are more.  I mean for one thing, you can have 
20 cases and 20 different defense attorneys and never have met them 
before, whereas 25 years ago, when I was in court on a daily basis, there 
was a finite group of defense attorneys; there was a finite group of 
judges.  You can have 25 trials now and have 25 different judges. . . . It’s 
just so big you don’t even have the capacity to know all the players 
anymore.
42
 
 
It is difficult to know how typical this pattern is.  Still, comments such as these 
suggest that prosecutor empirical research grounded in places that lack stable 
workgroups may yield conclusions about prosecutor behavior that do not resonate 
in locations where the effects of working groups are stronger. 
To be clear, we do not claim that working groups only appear in smaller, non-
urban jurisdictions.  It is possible to organize courtroom assignments in large cities 
to promote stable working groups that call for prosecutors to look outside their 
offices for signals about best practices.  We do think, however, that large urban 
prosecutor offices present a set of default presumptions that might guide a 
researcher at the start of an examination of any particular office.  Exceptions, 
where they exist, deserve attention and explanation.  
 
V. TURNOVER RATES 
 
Compounding the general influence of working group relationships, we think 
the turnover rate of the prosecutor’s office might influence the general level of 
adversariness among the lawyers who work there.  If large urban offices have 
                                                                                                                                      
42  Interview with Prosecutor 1405, Parton District Attorney’s Office.  To protect the 
confidentiality of our source, we can only reveal that interviews in this office took place during the 
fall of 2013. 
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higher turnover rates than offices in smaller locales, the high level of adversarial 
conduct observed in at least some large offices might be attributable, at least in 
part, to the relatively short prosecution careers of many of the staff. 
Taking the first point—the connection between turnover and adversariness—a 
prosecutor who enters the office intending to stay for only a few years, rather than 
to make a career there, might focus on making a reputation as a star litigator.  His 
goal is to catch the eye of future employers; he suspects that defense attorneys 
want to hire lawyers who are not afraid of trial, who display supreme levels of 
confidence, who do not back down from a fight.  An alternative hypothesis would 
be that prosecutors score points with future defense employers when they are 
balanced rather than adversarial. 
Which hypothesis is closer to the truth?  The limited empirical evidence on 
this topic appears to confirm the first hypothesis, that one’s value on the defense 
job market derives more from adversariness than from balanced behavior.  For 
instance, David Zaring found that prosecutors in New York with higher caseloads 
and more trials appeared to be more successful in the defense market.
43
  Where 
turnover is high, we can expect a greater percentage of the prosecutors in an office 
to be concerned with their future marketability, and thus to prioritize adversary 
conduct over balanced behavior. 
As for the second point—the correlation between turnover and office size—
we suspect that large urban offices have higher turnover rates than smaller offices 
in less populous areas for two primary reasons.
44
  First, the cost of living in large 
urban areas is higher than the cost of living in mid-size cities, suburban areas, or 
rural outposts.  Given the cost of living and the typical prosecutor salary, the 
lucrative appeal of private practice would be greater for prosecutors in large cities 
than it is in less expensive areas.  Secondly, there may be more professional 
opportunities for lawyers in large urban settings.
45
  While criminal defense practice 
is often fairly specialized in small or solo firms, prosecutors looking for new 
experiences and more money consider other types of practices too—insurance, 
civil litigation, and the like.  Fewer of those opportunities are likely to exist in 
smaller locales. 
                                                                                                                                      
43  The empirical evidence on this point comes from the federal prosecution sphere and thus 
might have limited relevance in the state criminal practice world.  Zaring tracked the prosecution 
activity and subsequent career movements of the people who worked as AUSAs in the Southern 
District of New York in 2001.  He defined success in the defense attorney market as securing highly 
paid partner positions in major firms.  See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507 (2013); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the 
Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J. L. & ECON. 627, 627 (2005) (higher trial rates in 
federal court districts located in cities with more active and lucrative defense hiring markets).  
44  We limit our hypothesis to the largest urban offices.  Limited evidence suggests that there 
is not much difference in turnover percentage between mid-sized and smaller offices.  See Wright, 
supra note 35, at 257 tbl.8.  
45  See Boylan & Long, supra note 43.  
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Putting the pieces together, the turnover rate of the prosecutor’s office can 
affect the formation of relationships with defense attorneys.  In an office with a 
high turnover rate, prosecutors may invest less in cooperative relationships with 
opposing counsel.  If large offices have higher turnover rates than smaller offices, 
this would partially explain why large office prosecutors do not tend to embrace 
the sort of balanced behavior we heard about in our mid-size and smaller offices.  
 
VI. OFFICE SIZE AS A SIGNAL OF BALANCE OR CYNICISM? 
 
We believe that office size, and the features that correlate with size and 
location, could explain some of the disparity between what our interviewees 
reported and what Professor Levenson experienced.  Professor Levenson’s 
argument stems from her litigation experience against one office: the Los Angeles 
County District Attorney, an office that employs almost 1,000 attorneys and is 
situated in a major urban district.  In contrast, our study in The Cure for Young 
Prosecutor’s Syndrome was based on structured interviews with prosecutors in 
eight small to mid-size offices in the American Southeast and Southwest.  Many of 
our interviewees from these small to mid-sized offices described the formation of 
stable workgroups, to greater or lesser degrees, as key to their practices.  
Moreover, limited personnel data from eight of the offices that we studied suggest 
that those small and mid-sized offices deal with only modest turnover rates.
46
  
Prosecutors in all of our offices indicated that their office leaders cared about 
relationships with the judiciary and the defense bar—again, in varying amounts—
and it’s likely that the history of these relationships was just as important as the 
size of the offices involved. 
Notably, the two largest offices in our study—both located in metropolitan 
areas—showed the most variation in terms of prosecutors’ acceptance of the 
balance narrative and the importance of relationships with defense attorneys.  Both 
offices assigned most of their felony lawyers to specialized units, causing them to 
rotate through courtrooms and judges rather than to remain in permanent 
courtroom assignments. 
Would we have found a more extreme pattern, and more cynicism, if we 
interviewed prosecutors in a larger urban office, the kind that employs hundreds 
rather than dozens of prosecutors, in a dense urban environment?  The preliminary 
                                                                                                                                      
46  Although we did not explore turnover rates for purposes of our 2014 article, we researched 
this question for purposes of this essay.  We tracked the number of attorneys who left each office to 
practice law elsewhere as of June 2015.  The Atkins and Harris District Attorney offices experienced 
17% and 15% departure rates during the three years since the interviews.  The Dean State Attorney’s 
Office, located in a relatively far-removed suburban county, registered 25% turnover over a two-year 
period.  The remaining offices, all located close to or entirely within major cities (but with 
populations smaller than Los Angeles, Chicago, and the other cities that typically receive scholarly 
attention), mostly had turnover rates between 30% and 36%.  The exception was the Brooks County 
Attorney’s office, with a 50% turnover rate, probably explained by a change in office leadership.  
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data from our ninth office, which is a large urban office with high turnover, 
suggests that the portrait of prosecution in that setting is more mixed than we 
found elsewhere, but also more varied than what Professor Levenson experienced 
in Los Angeles.  The balance narrative did not predominate but neither was it 
completely absent.  The fifty prosecutors we interviewed in our largest urban 
office identified several features consistent with zealotry, callousness, and 
cynicism in the office leadership and among their co-workers, thus buttressing the 
portrait of prosecution that Professor Levenson and others have articulated.  But 
the interview transcripts from our ninth office also include statements that support 
the career path toward balance—for at least some of the people who work there.  
This heterogeneity suggests to us that even in a large urban office, a single set 
of expectations does not dictate how everyone behaves.  Just as we acknowledge 
that our research design leaves open the possibility of selection bias among those 
who agreed to an interview—and in what the interviewees chose to reveal—studies 
of large urban offices ought to watch for sub-currents or even counter-currents 
among prosecutors who work there.
47
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION:  
THE PROSPECTS FOR GENERALIZABLE KNOWLEDGE IN PROSECUTOR RESEARCH 
 
In light of this variation in prosecutor offices, is it possible for scholars ever to 
generalize about the prosecution world based on field studies of particular offices?  
Once we acknowledge that prosecutor offices differ from one another across size 
and other variables, must we limit ourselves to single observations, producing case 
studies with little relevance beyond their idiosyncratic setting?  
Our answer, in classic lawyerly fashion, is that it depends.  While some 
observations probably carry across place to a large number of prosecutor offices, 
office size and location should set preliminary boundaries on the generalizability 
of other research findings.  That is, we should think about prosecution offices as a 
collection of types,
48
 where each group is characterized by a set of default 
presumptions based on a recurring set of features, with some features common to 
all groups and others that are more group-specific.  Still other features would be 
site-specific.  This multi-layered orientation seems more authentic than treating 
any single prosecutor’s office as a generic setting with essential characteristics that 
operate on all prosecutors alike, wherever they happen to work.  Under this 
framework, large urban offices present one type of office, mid-size offices another, 
                                                                                                                                      
47  See Wright & Levine, supra note 3, at 1078–80; Levine & Wright, supra note 3; Kay L. 
Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1142–44 
(2012). 
48  See HOWARD S. BECKER, TRICKS OF THE TRADE: HOW TO THINK ABOUT YOUR RESEARCH 
WHILE YOU’RE DOING IT (1998) (on the importance of using typologies).  
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and small offices still another.
49
  Similarly, offices in different regions might share 
some characteristics that cut across office size.
50
  Once we recognize that variation 
in prosecution practice and attitude may correlate with office size and other 
qualities connected to a place, we should watch closely our claims about the 
generalizability of any observations made in one office setting. 
Distinguishing between different criminal justice environments to promote 
clarity and precision is not a radical idea.  It has surfaced in the courtroom process 
literature lately, with scholars showing how different norms and problems attend to 
misdemeanor processing than to felony processing.
51
  For that reason, the reform 
proposals that emerge from felony studies do not make much sense in 
misdemeanor land.  Distinct reform proposals are appropriate for each division; 
reforms should account for the peculiarities, resources, and constraints present in 
each setting. 
We suggest that the same wisdom applies to the study of prosecutors.  
Attention to the place—including the size of the office and the relationships both 
inside and outside the office—should guide our conclusions and ideas about how 
to generate more justice in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
49  Setting a defensible dividing line between these tentative categories is beyond the scope of 
this essay.  
50  Other characteristics, such as the political styles of the leadership, might create their own 
categories that do not overlap neatly with office size.  See Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and 
Organizational Strategies of American Prosecutors: Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 
12 LAW & POL’Y 25 (1990). 
51  See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 101 (2012); Jenny Roberts, 
Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011).  
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Appendix. Empirical Studies of Prosecutor Offices
52
 
 
 Article Title Authors Citation 
1 
The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining Albert Alschuler 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 
(1968) 
2 
Plea Bargaining’s Triumph George Fisher 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000) 
 
3 
Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System 
Albert Alschuler 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 
(1983)  
4 
Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the 
Effects of Miranda 
Paul G. Cassell & 
Bret Hayman 
43 UCLA L. REV. 839 
(1996) 
5 
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
Milton Heumann 1978 
6 
FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
CRIMINAL COURTS 
James Eisenstein 
& Herbert Jacob 
1977 
7 
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff Ronald Wright & 
Marc Miller 
55 STAN. L. REV. 29 
(2002) 
8 
A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process Welsh S. White 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439 
(1971) 
9 
The Black Box Marc Miller & 
Ronald Wright 
94 IOWA L. REV. 125 
(2008) 
10 
JUSTICE BY CONSENT:  PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN 
COURTHOUSE 
Arthur I. Rosett & 
Donald R. Cressey 
1976 
11 
The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on 
Prosecution: An Empirical Study 
Wallace D. Loh 55 WASH. L. REV. 543 
(1980) 
12 
Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute 
Josh Bowers 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 
(2010)  
13 
THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME: CRIMINAL PROCESS AND 
CULTURAL OBSESSION 
Stuart A. 
Scheingold 
1991 
14 
THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY 
PLEA PROCESS 
Peter F. Nardulli et 
al. 
1988 
15 
The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in 
Historical Perspective 
Carolyn B. 
Ramsey 
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1309 (2002) 
16 
The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official 
Reactions to Rape 
Gary D. LaFree 45 AM. SOC. REV. 842 
(1980) 
17 
Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, 
and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking 
Lisa Frohmann 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
531 (1997) 
18 
The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the 
Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges 
Cassia Spohn et al. 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 
(1987) 
19 
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty Celesta A. 
Albonetti 
21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
291 (1987) 
 
                                                                                                                                      
52   Data in this Appendix represent search counts as of April 6, 2016.  These databases 
constantly add new material, and content may change on any given day without notice to database 
users.  See D. Daniel Sokol, News on the Lack of Westlaw Access for Oxford University Press 
Journals, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POLICY BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/08/news-on-the-lack-of-westlaw-access-for-oxford-university-press-
journals.html [https://perma.cc/6PLZ-3K2Q]; Jia You, Just How Big is Google Scholar? Ummm . . ., 
SCIENCE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/09/just-how-big-google-scholar-
ummm [https://perma.cc/U226-LBU8]. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 318 123 251 122 869 123 479 123 
10 cities 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
2 313 122 301 123 345 120 320 122 
Middlesex, MA (historical) 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
3 194 120 175 119 329 119 233 119 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
4 194 120 181 120 318 118 231 119 
Salt Lake County DA Office 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
5 123 117 108 117 357 121 196 118 
3 CT cities 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
6 114 116 95 116 820 122 343 118 
Baltimore, Chicago 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
7 168 118 163 118 253 115 195 117 
New Orleans 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
8 86 113 58 111 159 108 101 111 
Philadelphia and New York 
DA Offices 
0 1 0 0 0 
9 83 112 63 112 117 99 88 108 
New Orleans, Milwaukee, 
Charlotte & San Diego DA offices 
0 0 0 0 0 
10 38 102 35 102 306 117 126 107 
CA statewide 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
11 49 108 41 107 131 106 74 107 
King County WA 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
12 72 111 64 113 94 88 77 104 
Iowa statewide, NY statewide, 
NYC 
0 1 1 0 0 
13 41 104 39 105 126 102 69 104 
King County WA 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
14 41 104 33 98 144 107 73 103 
9 Midwestern jurisdictions 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
15 61 110 54 110 95 89 70 103 
New York County 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
16 31 92 34 100 257 116 107 103 
Large Midwestern city 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
17 34 97 31 95 185 110 83 101 
“Center Heights” branch office of 
DA office, major metro West Coast 
0 0 0 0 1 
18 34 97 27 91 183 109 81 99 
Los Angeles 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
19 31 92 27 91 227 113 95 99 
DC Superior Court 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
 
Columns: 
 
1) Westlaw Cites      2) Westlaw Score      3) Lexis Cites         
4) Lexis Score       5) Google Scholar Cites  6) Google Scholar Score    
7) Average of 1, 3 & 5   8) Average of 2, 4 & 6    9) Jurisdiction(s) Studied  
10) Federal         11) Large         12) Statewide 
13) Nationwide       14) Single Office 
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 Article Title Authors Citation 
20 
Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial 
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
David Bjerk 48 J. L. & ECON. 591 
(2005) 
21 
The New Prosecution Kay Levine 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1125 (2005) 
22 
The Organizational Context of Criminal Sentencing Jo Dixon 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157 
(1995) 
23 
Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before 
SB 1070 
Ingrid Eagly 58  UCLA L. REV. 1749 
(2011)  
24 
The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso 
County, Texas 
Robert Weninger 35 UCLA L. REV. 265 
(1987) 
25 
The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary 
Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study 
Steven F. Shatz 59 FLA. L. REV. 719 
(2007)  
26 
Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: 
The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute 
Milton Heumann 
& Colin Loftin 
13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
393 (1979) 
27 
The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial 
Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants 
Adam Gershowitz 
& Laura Killinger 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 261 
(2011) 
28 
The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, 
and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload 
Kay Levine 55 EMORY L.J. 691 (2006) 
29 
Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds can Learn 
from the States 
Rachel Barkow 109 MICH. L. REV. 519 
(2011)  
30 
The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game Abraham 
Blumberg 
1  LAW & SOC’Y REV. 15 
(1967) 
31 
Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in 
Plea Bargaining 
Anne Heinz & 
Wayne Kerstetter 
13  LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
349 (1979) 
32 
The Decision to Prosecute George F. Cole 4  LAW & SOC’Y REV. 331 
(1970) 
33 
Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable Reform Donna M. Bishop 
et al. 
35 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 179 (1989) 
34 
Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion? 
A Bronx County, New York Case Study 
Roland Acevedo 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987 
(1995) 
35 
The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality George T. 
Felkenes 
7 SW. U. L. REV. 98 
(1975) 
36 
The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties David Lynch 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
115 (1994) 
37 
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT  
Malcolm Feeley 1979 
38 
The Power to Punish: Discretion and Sentencing Reform in 
the War on Drugs 
Rodney Engen & 
Sara Steen 
105 AM. J. SOC. 1357 
(2000) 
39 
An Empirical Study of Kent Style Juvenile Transfers to 
Criminal Court 
Robert O. Dawson 23 ST. MARY’S L.J. 975 
(1992)  
40 
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in 
Local Enforcement 
Ingrid Eagly 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 
(2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] PLACE MATTERS IN PROSECUTION RESEARCH 695 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
20 32 95 39 105 103 93 58 98 
BJS 75 urban counties 
 
0 1 0 1 0 
21 40 103 44 108 66 80 50 97 
CA 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
22 26 83 26 89 252 114 101 95 
MN 73 counties 
 
0 0 1 0 0 
23 43 106 35 102 52 74 43 94 
Phoenix 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
24 37 101 34 100 63 79 45 93 
El Paso County, TX 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
25 45 107 38 104 35 60 39 90 
Alameda County CA 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
26 29 89 18 75 129 104 59 89 
Detroit 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
27 34 97 33 98 50 73 39 89 
Houston TX and other largest 
prosecutor offices 
0 1 0 0 0 
28 33 96 30 94 53 75 39 88 
CA 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
29 36 100 31 95 44 69 37 88 
Multiple states, interviews 
 
0 1 0 1 0 
30 111 115 87 115 9 33 69 88 
“Metropolitan Court” 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
31 27 85 21 83 102 92 50 87 
Dade County FL 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
32 16 66 20 80 216 112 84 86 
Kings County WA 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
33 28 88 19 78 97 90 48 85 
Florida, two urban counties 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
34 30 91 32 97 39 66 34 85 
Bronx 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
35 52 109 52 109 10 35 38 84 
CA 2 southern counties,            
AL 1 county 
0 0 0 0 0 
36 26 83 26 89 56 76 36 83 
2 pseudonyms, 350K each 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
37 180 119 183 121 1 7 121 82 
New Haven 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
38 18 73 18 75 107 96 48 81 
WA statewide 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
39 28 88 22 85 47 71 32 81 
DC Superior Court 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
40 31 92 27 91 35 60 31 81 
LA, Phoenix, Houston 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
 
Columns: 
 
1) Westlaw Cites      2) Westlaw Score      3) Lexis Cites          
4) Lexis Score       5) Google Scholar Cites  6) Google Scholar Score    
7) Average of 1, 3 & 5   8) Average of 2, 4 & 6    9) Jurisdiction(s) Studied  
10) Federal         11) Large         12) Statewide 
13) Nationwide       14) Single Office 
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 Article Title Authors Citation 
41 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences 
Jeffery T. Ulmer et 
al. 
44 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 427 (2007) 
42 
Prosecuting Sexual Assault Cassia Spohn & 
David Holleran 
18 JUST. Q. 651 (2001) 
43 
THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY Joan E. Jacoby 1980 
 
44 
The Impact of Victim Assessment on Prosecutors’ Screening 
Decisions 
Elizabeth Anne 
Stanko 
16  LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
225 (1981) 
45 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges in Domestic 
Violence Cases 
Janell Schmidt & 
Ellen H. Steury 
27 CRIMINOLOGY 487 
(1989) 
46 
Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in 
Regulating Plea Bargaining  
Alissa Pollitz 
Worden 
73 JUDICATURE 335 
(1990) 
47 
Plea Bargains, Concessions and the Courts: Analysis of a 
Quasi-Experiment 
Thomas W. 
Church, Jr. 
10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
377 (1976) 
48 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor Brian Forst & 
Kathleen Brosi 
6 J. LEG. STUD. 177 
(1977) 
49 
Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting 
Negligent Parents 
Jennifer M. Collins 100 NW. U. L. REV. 807 
(2006)  
50 
The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New 
Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States 
Leonard R. Mellon 
et al. 
72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 52 (1981) 
51 
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors Issa Kohler-
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66 STAN. L. REV. 611 
(2014)  
52 
Grassroots Plea Bargaining Josh Bowers 91 Marquette L. Rev. 85 
(2007) 
53 
Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform Daniel Richman 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055 
(2006) 
54 
The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study 
in Cooperation and Discretion 
Lisa L. Miller & 
James Eisenstein 
30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
239 (2005) 
55 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT Harry Subin U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
1966 
56 
Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty Celesta A. 
Albonetti 
24 CRIMINOLOGY 623 
(1986) 
57 
PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL-
CASE DISPOSITION 
Lynn Mather 1979 
58 
Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony Cases Donald McIntyre 
& David Lippman 
56 ABA J. 1154 (1970) 
59 
Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-Setting Effect 
of Crime News on Prosecutors 
David Pritchard 50 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 
143 (1986) 
60 
The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order David T. Johnson 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
247 (1998) 
61 
Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in the Wisconsin Department of Justice 
Michael Kades 25 AM CRIM. L. REV. 115 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
41 18 73 16 72 110 97 48 81 
PA statewide 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
42 17 68 14 69 128 103 53 80 
Kansas City and Philadelphia 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
43 97 114 85 114 2 12 61 80 
New Orleans, Kansas City, 
Boulder 
0 0 0 0 0 
44 17 68 12 66 125 101 51 78 
Manhattan Prosecutor’s office 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
45 12 60 15 71 117 99 48 77 
Milwaukee 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
46 23 79 22 85 38 65 28 76 
Georgia statewide 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
47 17 68 12 66 106 95 45 76 
Midwestern state, suburban 
county 
0 0 0 0 1 
48 16 66 17 74 81 85 38 75 
Washington DC 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
49 28 87 20 80 31 58 26 75 
National survey, state courts 
 
0 1 0 1 0 
50 21 77 19 78 40 67 27 74 
10 offices 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
51 24 81 22 85 29 56 25 74 
New York City 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
52 25 82 21 83 29 56 25 74 
New York City 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
53 23 79 23 88 26 53 24 73 
New Orleans 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
54 17 68 20 80 46 70 28 73 
Big City 
 
1 1 0 0 0 
55 21 77 9 60 66 80 32 72 
DC office 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
56 8 47 11 64 129 104 49 72 
DC office 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
57 8 47 18 75 86 87 37 70 
Los Angeles 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
58 20 76 7 48 79 83 35 69 
Chicago, LA, Brooklyn, Detroit, 
Baltimore, Houston 
0 1 0 0 0 
59 11 56 8 54 99 91 39 67 
DA office, Milwaukee County, 
Wisconsin 
0 0 0 0 1 
60 17 68 16 72 35 60 23 67 
“Laconia” CA (146) and Japan 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
61 19 75 11 64 11 39 14 59 
WI state AG office 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
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Bernstein et al. 
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(1977) 
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Plea Bargaining in Oregon: An Exploratory Study James Klonoski et 
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69 
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RES. J. 407 (1981) 
70 
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Note 60 IOWA L. REV. 1053 
(1975) 
71 
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Marc Miller & 
Samantha Caplinger 
41 CRIME & JUST. 265 
(2012) 
72 
Community Prosecution: Portland’s Experience, in 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 
Barbara Boland David Karp ed., 1998 
73 
Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District 
Attorneys 
Kim Banks Mayer 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295 
(1996) 
74 
Gender Differences in Informal Processing: A Look at Charge 
Bargaining and Sentence Reduction in Washington, D.C. 
Josefina Figueira-
McDonough 
22 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 101 (1985) 
75 
Plea Bargaining in North Carolina James E. Bond 54 NC L. Rev. 823(1976) 
 
76 
Expressive Enforcement Avlana Eisenberg 61 UCLA L. REV. 858 
(2014)  
77 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF 
FELONY CASES IN KING COUNTY  
Robert D. 
Crutchfield et al. 
WASH. STATE MINORITY & 
JUSTICE COMM’N (1995) 
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Plea Bargaining Policy and State District Court Caseloads: 
An Interrupted Time Series Analysis 
Malcolm D. 
Holmes et al. 
26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
139 (1992) 
79 
Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North 
Carolina 
Ronald Wright 41 CRIME & JUST. 211 
(2012)  
80 
Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious Violent Offenses Jeffrey T. Ulmer & 
Mindy S. Bradley 
44 CRIMINOLOGY 631 
(2006) 
81 
PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING: A NATIONAL STUDY Joan E. Jacoby et 
al. 
NAT’L INST. JUSTICE 
(1982) 
82 
SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN 
CRIMINAL COURTS 
Pamela J. Utz 1978 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
62 3 21 6 43 193 111 67 58 
City in upstate NY 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
63 12 60 12 66 16 47 13 58 
Manhattan 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
64 10 54 8 54 24 51 14 53 
Durham, NC 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
65 12 60 8 54 13 44 11 53 
Brooklyn 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
66 4 30 4 30 104 94 37 51 
Wayne County, MI 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
67 12 60 8 54 11 39 10 51 
Alameda County CA 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
68 11 56 5 38 27 55 14 50 
Survey of OR prosecutors 
 
0 0 1 0 0 
69 6 38 10 62 16 47 11 49 
New York City 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
70 15 65 8 54 7 25 10 48 
Rural/industrial county in 
Iowa 
0 0 0 0 1 
71 11 56 10 62 7 25 9.3 48 
AZ, 9 offices 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
72 7 43 7 48 24 51 13 47 
Portland, Oregon DA Office 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
73 9 51 7 48 12 41 9.3 47 
WI statewide survey 
 
0 0 1 0 0 
74 4 30 4 30 49 72 19 44 
DC office 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
75 10 54 6 43 10 35 8.7 44 
Survey of all NC elected 
 
0 0 1 0 0 
76 8 47 7 48 10 35 8.3 43 
52 prosecutors, 23 states 
 
0 1 0 1 0 
77 12 60 8 54 4 15 8 43 
King County WA 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
78 27 85 6 43 0 1 11 43 
El Paso, TX 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
79 9 51 9 60 6 17 8 43 
NC, 13 offices 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
80 3 21 2 18 85 86 30 42 
PA 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
81 5 35 4 30 34 59 14 41 
80 urban prosecutors 
 
0 1 0 1 0 
82 2 11 4 30 67 82 24 41 
San Diego, Alameda 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
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Guilty Plea Negotiations and the Exclusionary Rule of 
Evidence: A Case Study of Chicago Narcotics Courts 
J.A. Gilboy 67 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1976) 
84 
Leveraging Death Sherod Thaxton 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 475 (2013) 
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86 
Charge Reduction: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Discretion 
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8 J. QUANTITATIVE 
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87 
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89 
A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process Donald M. 
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59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 
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90 
Why Federal Prosecutors Charge: A Comparison of Federal 
and New York State Arson and Robbery Filings, 2006–2010 
Susan R. Klein et 
al. 
51 HOUS. L. REV. 1381 
(2014)  
91 
Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death 
Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County 
Nicholas Petersen 
& Mona Lynch 
102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1233 (2012) 
92 
Gender Differences in Felony Court Processing: Three 
Hypotheses of Disparity 
M. Farnworth & 
R.H.C. Teske 
6 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 
23 (1995) 
93 
Empirical Analysis of Race and the Process of Capital 
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Isaac Unah 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
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94 
Prosecutorial Discretion—A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor’s 
Unbridled Discretion and Its Potential For Abuse 
John Lundquist 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485 
(1972) 
95 
Charge Reduction: An Intermediary State in the Process of 
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Ilene Bernstein et 
al. 
56 SOC. FORCES 362 
(1977) 
96 
An Experience in Justice Without Plea Negotiation Sam W. Callan 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
327 (1979) 
97 
The Influence of Politics upon the Office of the American 
Prosecutor 
James Johnson 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 187 
(1973) 
98 
Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital 
Punishment: The Rosenthal Era 
Scott Phillips 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131 
(2012)  
99 
Plea Bargaining in Nebraska—The Prosecutor’s Perspective Fred Kray & John 
Berman 
11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 94 
(1977) 
100 
Refusing to Prosecute Minor Offenses: The Relative Influence 
of Legal and Extralegal Factors 
Kenneth Adams & 
Charles R. Cutshall 
4 JUST. Q. 595 (1987) 
101 
Going for the Gold: Prosecutorial Decision Making in Cases 
of Wife Assault 
David Rauma 13 SOC. SCI. RES. 321 
(1984) 
102 
Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual Constraints 
on Prosecutorial Decision Making 
Don Stemen & 
Bruce Frederick 
31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 
(2013) 
103 
Just Cause or Just Because?: Prosecution and Plea-Bargaining 
Resulting in Prison Sentences on Low-Level Drug Charges 
K. Jack Riley et al. RAND CORP. (2005) 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
83 7 43 5 38 12 41 8 41 
Chicago 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
84 7 43 7 48 8 31 7.3 41 
Georgia death penalty 
 
0 0 1 0 0 
85 3 21 2 18 58 78 21 39 
Delaware County and Pima 
County 
0 0 0 0 0 
86 5 35 2 18 36 63 14 39 
Jacksonville, FL 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
87 2 11 14 69 10 35 8.7 38 
Chicago 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
88 6 38 4 30 16 47 8.7 38 
Kings County WA 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
89 7 43 1 5 36 63 15 37 
Chicago 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
90 11 56 6 43 2 12 6.3 37 
NY statewide, Federal 
 
1 1 1 0 0 
91 8 47 5 38 7 25 6.7 37 
Los Angeles 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
92 3 21 1 5 79 83 28 36 
CA statewide 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
93 5 35 3 28 13 44 7 36 
NC, death penalty 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
94 9 51 5 38 6 17 6.7 35 
Los Angeles 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
95 0 1 1 5 115 98 39 35 
Major city in NY 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
96 1 2 7 48 26 53 11 34 
El Paso 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
97 4 30 3 28 13 44 6.7 34 
Nationwide survey 
 
0 1 0 1 0 
98 6 38 4 30 9 33 6.3 34 
Houston 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
99 6 38 6 43 6 17 6 33 
Survey of 62 NE prosecutors 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
100 2 11 1 5 41 68 15 28 
DC office 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
101 1 2 1 5 57 77 20 28 
Santa Barbara, CA 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
102 6 38 2 18 7 25 5 27 
Two pseudonyms 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
103 4 30 4 30 6 17 4.7 26 
AZ, CA 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
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Limited Inquiry Into the Nature of the Process 
Thomas A. 
Goldsmith 
1989 DENV. U. L. REV. 
243 (1989) 
105 
In Search of Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor Angela J. Davis 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 821 (2013) 
106 
Prosecutors and the Disposition of Criminal Cases: An 
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The Liberation Hypothesis and Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
in the Application of California’s Three Strikes Law 
Elsa Y. Chen 6 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. 
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Factors Affecting the Plea-Bargaining Process in Erie 
County: Some Tentative Findings 
Karen Rebrovich 26 BUFF. L. REV. 693 
(1977) 
109 
Prosecutor Elections, Mistakes, and Appeals Bryan C. 
McCannon 
10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 696 (2013) 
110 
A Study of Criminal Justice Discretion J. Langley Miller 
& John J. Sloan 
22 J. CRIM. JUST. 107 
(1994) 
111 
The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome Ronald Wright & 
Kay Levine 
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065 
(2014) 
112 
Burglary and Robbery Plea Bargaining in California: An 
Organizational Perspective 
J. Fred Springer 8 JUST. SYS. J 157 (1983) 
113 
The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and 
the Evaluation of Actual Innocence 
Dana Carver 
Boehm 
2014 UTAH L. REV. 613 
(2014) 
114 
THE LIMITS OF ORDER: UNCERTAINTY OF ADAPTATION IN A 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
Lief H. Carter 1974 
115 
Plea Bargaining: Reform in Two Cities Raymond Nimmer 
& Patricia Krauthaus 
3 JUST. SYS. J. 6 (1977) 
116 
Probing the Limits of the Female Advantage in Criminal Processing: 
Pretrial Diversion of Drug Offenders in an Urban County 
Nicholas Alozie & 
C. Wayne Johnston 
21 JUST. SYS. J. 239 
(2000) 
117 
People v. Coughlin and Criticisms of the Criminal Jury in 
Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago 
Elizabeth Dale 28 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 
503 (2008) 
118 
The Cost of Strict Discovery: A Comparison of Manhattan 
and Brooklyn Criminal Cases 
Dan Svirsky 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 523 (2014) 
119 
The Social and Occupational Mobility of Prosecutors: New 
York City, in THE PROSECUTOR 
J.J. Fishman W.F. McDonald ed., 1979 
120 
Politics and Criminal Prosecution in New Orleans, in THE 
POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE  
H. Jacob James Klonoski & Robert 
Mendelsohn eds., 1970 
121 
Prosecution of Felony Arrests, 1986: Indianapolis, Los Angeles, 
New Orleans, Portland, St. Louis, and Washington DC 
Barbara Boland et 
al. 
NCJ 113248 (1989) 
122 
Prosecution in 3-D Kay Levine & 
Ronald Wright 
102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012) 
123 
PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 
Peter Greenwood 
et al. 
1976 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
104 3 21 5 38 6 17 4.7 25 
6 CO offices 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
105 3 21 4 30 6 17 4.3 23 
Manhattan, Milwaukee, 
Charlotte 
0 1 0 0 0 
106 3 21 1 5 12 41 5.3 22 
Illinois 
0 1 1 0 0 
107 1 2 1 5 18 50 6.7 19 
CA statewide 
 
0 1 1 0 0 
108 2 11 2 18 7 25 3.7 18 
Erie County NY 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
109 1 2 2 18 8 31 3.7 17 
22 Counties in Western NY 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
110 2 11 2 18 6 17 3.3 15 
Pseudonym, 130 attys 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
111 3 21 2 18 1 7 2 15 
8 offices SE and SW 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
112 2 11 2 18 5 16 3 15 
3 CA Counties 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
113 4 30 0 1 2 12 2 14 
Dallas TX, Harris Cty TX, NY Cty, 
Santa Clara Cty CA, Cook Cty IL 
0 1 0 0 0 
114 2 11 2 18 1 7 1.7 12 
Alameda County CA 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
115 2 11 1 5 6 17 3 11 
Detroit, Denver 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
116 1 2 1 5 7 25 3 11 
Maricopa AZ 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
117 2 11 1 5 1 7 1.3 7.7 
Chicago 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
118 3 21 0 1 0 1 1 7.7 
Brooklyn, Manhattan 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
119 2 11 1 5 0 1 1 5.7 
New York City 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
120 1 2 0 1 1 7 0.7 3.3 
New Orleans 
 
0 0 0 0 1 
121 1 2 1 5 0 1 0.7 2.7 
See title 
 
0 1 0 0 0 
122 1 2 1 5 0 1 0.7 2.7 
SE and SW offices 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
123 1 2 0 1 0 1 0.3 1.3 
Los Angeles 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
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4) Lexis Score       5) Google Scholar Cites  6) Google Scholar Score    
7) Average of 1, 3 & 5   8) Average of 2, 4 & 6    9) Jurisdiction(s) Studied  
10) Federal         11) Large         12) Statewide 
13) Nationwide       14) Single Office 
 
 
 
